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Nāmarūpa; a Linguistic Perspective* 
Liudmila Olalde 
Abstract 
Nāmarūpa (literally “name and form”) is widely known as a Buddhist concept, relevant 
in the context of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), and the skandhas. Yet, the 
compound is also found in the early Upaniṣads and a closer look at the Vedic corpus 
reveals that nāman and rūpa also appear closely related to each other in earlier texts. 
Generally, textual scholars explain nāmarūpa—both in Buddhist and non-Buddhist 
texts—as a designation of “individuality” or “empirical reality,” whereby nāman and 
rūpa tend to be regarded as counterparts. In this paper I consider the “non-Buddhist” use 
of the term from a linguistic perspective. Inspired on a 1987 article by Edward S. Small, I 
intend to explore to what extent modern theories on the linguistic sign—such as 
Saussure’s bipartite model of signifier and signified, and the triangle of reference of 
Ogden and Richards (1923)—may shed light on the relationship between nāman and rūpa 
and help us establish finer nuances in the meaning of the compound. The purpose of this 
analysis is to challenge tacit assumptions about language in recent interpretations of 
nāmarūpa and thus contribute to a better understanding of its usage in Buddhist texts 
prior to the systematization of the Abhidharma. 
Introduction 
Probably one of the first things that comes to mind when hearing the word nāmarūpa 
(literally “name and form”) is nāmarūpa as the fourth member of the Buddhist chain of 
dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), a technical term that in Abhidharma literature 
is said to refer to the five skandhas or constituent groups, whereby -rūpa is identified 
with the rūpaskandha and nāma- with the other four groups vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra 
and vijñāna.1 Along with this analysis, nāmarūpa is often explained as “mind and 
matter,” “mind and body,” “mental and physical phenomena,” and numerous similar 
                                                          
*  Paper presented at the 16th World Sanskrit Conference, Bangkok, 30th June 2015. 
1 nāma catvāro'rūpiṇaḥ skandhāḥ / katame catvāraḥ? vedanāskandhaḥ / saṃjñāskandhaḥ / 
saṃskāraskandhaḥ / vijñānaskandhaḥ / idaṃ nāma / rūpaṃ katamat? yatkiṃcidrūpam, 
taccatvāri mahābhūtāni / catvāri ca mahābhūtāny upādāya (Arthaviniścayasūtra, Vaidya 1961: 
312f.) “‘name’ refers to the non-material constituent groups. Which four? The feelings 
constituent group, the perceptions constituent group, the volitional processes constituent 
group, the consciousness constituent group. What is form? All that is form is the four great 
elements and what depends on the four great elements” (trans. LO; I follow Bhikkhu 
Ānandajoti [2009] in my translation of skandha and saṃskāra). 
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phrases.2 Far less attention has been given to the non-Buddhist usage of the term prior to 
its fixation by the Abhidharma. As a compound word nāmarūpa is actually attested seven 
times in the early Upaniṣads;3 it is also found once in the Jaiminīyopaniṣadbrāhmaṇa or 
Talavakāropaniṣad (4.22.8) as well as in the first Pariśiṣta to the Atharvaveda (1.16.1). 
Moreover, phrases such as nāma rūpaṃ ca or rūpaṃ caiva nāma ca come up in the 
Śatapathabrāhmaṇa, the Atharvaveda and the Taittirīyabrāhmaṇa.4 Interestingly, 
scholars of Sanskrit and Buddhism seem to regard the non-Buddhist term as self-
explanatory.5 Thus the discussions of the non-Buddhist nāmarūpa in research literature 
are normally brief and quite similar. The term is explained as referring either to 
individuality6 or to the “empirical world,”7 which is characterized by individuation. In the 
last decades, however, nāmarūpa has attracted the attention of scholars of Buddhism who 
turn back to the “older” usage in order to elaborate alternative interpretations that aim to 
grasp the “original” meaning of the Buddhist term. I observe that in doing so they have 
emphasized the twofold structure of the compound with renderings such as “name and 
named” (Hamilton 1996: 127), or “appearance and conceptualization.”8 These 
interpretations have three things in common: First, they regard nāman as the element in 
the compound that requires further explanation. Second, they understand “name” as 
“designation” and neglect the fact that it also (or may I say actually) means “proper 
                                                          
2 For instance, “esprit et corps” (Masson-Oursel 1915: 32); “das Geistige und Materielle” 
(Geiger 1925: 2); “Geistigkeit und Körperlichkeit” (Nyanatiloka [1953] 1983: 132); 
“psychischer und physischer Organismus” (Frauwallner 1953: 212); “mental and physical 
phenomena, i.e., the objects of cognition or mind and body” (Yamada 1980: 267); 
“psychophysique” (Sugunasiri 1995: 415); “mentality-materiality” (Bodhi [1995] 2005: 30); 
“mind and bodily form” (Ānandajoti 2009: 6). 
3 BĀU 1.4.7 and 1.6.3; ChU 6.3.2, 6.3.3, and 8.14.1; PrU 6.5; and MuU 3.2.8. 
4 Whereas the phrases rūpeṇa caiva nāmnā … rūpaṃ caiva nāma ca in ŚB 11.2.3 as well as the 
occurrences of nāman and rūpa in TB 2.2.7—where they appear in different sentences—are 
generally understood as equivalent to nāmarūpa, in the following passages it remains unclear 
whether the juxtaposition of these terms is related to the compound: AV 11.7.1. ucchiṣṭe 
nāma rūpaṃ ca; AV 12.5.9. āyuś ca rūpaṃ ca nāma ca; TB 3.12.7. tapo damam, nāma rūpaṃ 
ca bhūtānām; TB 3.10.5. tapo nāma rūpam amṛtam. 
5 For instance, Heinrich Kern (1882: 432): “Durch Name und Form stellt sich jedes Ding als 
solches, als Individuum dar. Darum erhält das zusammengesetzte Wort nāmarūpam Name-
und-Form den Sinn oder die Bedeutung von Individualität.” 
6 For instance, Stchoupak/Nitti/Renou (1959: 358a s.v. nāman) and Frauwallner ([1973] 1984: 
72): “[…] the idea of names and forms (nāmarūpe) as a formative principle, which defines the 
nature and uniqueness of different things.” In the original German version (1953: 93): “[…] 
die Vorstellung von Namen und Form (nāmarūpam) als formendem Prinzip, welches Wesen 
und Eigenart der verschiedenen Dinge bestimmt.” 
7 For instance: “empirische Realität” (Deussen 1921: 909a s.v. Name); “The definition of 
worldly reality as nāma-rūpa” (Falk 1943: 1); and “[…] a general expression for the empirical 
world is: the world of name and form (nāmarūpa)” (Staal 1979: 12). 
8 Reat (1987: 18): “appearance and conceptualization of a given object of consciousness.” 
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name;” in this manner they understand name as “naming” and assume that it always 
encompasses conceptualisation.9 Third, they focus on the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad and the 
Chāndogyopaniṣad. The question I want to address in this paper is if the equation of 
nāman with conceptualisation and cognitive processes is really supported by the pre-
Abhidharmic usage and meaning of the Sanskrit nāman or if it rather corresponds to a 
modern understanding of language as defined in post-Saussurean linguistics,10 that is, of 
language as a sign system. In the first part I will give an overview of two main theories 
on the linguistic sign advanced in modern linguistics in order to assess to what extent 
they can account for the relationship between nāman and rūpa in the Vedic texts 
(beginning with the Ṛgveda). In the second part I will examine some interpretations of 
the so called “pre-Buddhist” term on the basis of these linguistic theories. In the third part 
I will discuss the usage of nāman and rūpa as separate terms and lastly I will provide a 
more differentiated view of the nāmarūpa-passages in the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads, 
one that may better explain why nāmarūpa was fixed as a technical term in Buddhist 
literature. 
1. The linguistic sign 
According to a classical definition, a sign is something that stands for something else 
(aliquid stat pro aliquo). A characteristic feature of signs is furthermore that they are 
perceptible. Thus Augustine (354–430 CE) explains that  
A sign is something that shows itself to the senses and something other than itself to the 
mind (Signum est quod se ipsum sensui et praeter se aliquid animo ostendit).11  
                                                          
9 For instance, Hamilton in her discussion of BĀU 1.6.1–3 (1996: 122): “Everything that is 
nāma arises from speech (vāc); and everything that is rūpa arises from the eye. Vāc was an 
important term in the Brahmanical religion prior to the time of the Buddha as it was one of the 
subjects of speculation about the nature of the self and the universe in the late Vedic and early 
Upaniṣadic period. Here, however, apart from connotations associated with such speculation, 
the association of nāma with vāc suggests the conceptual nature of nāma: that it is the 
conferral of differentiation by verbal means, i.e. the practice of naming […].” 
10 Saussure’s pivotal role in the development of linguistics is summarised by Levin (1965: 
138f.): “A shift from emphasis on the historical and comparative studies which had largely 
occupied the scholars of the nineteenth century can be dated at 1915, when F. de Saussure’s 
posthumous work, Cours de linguistique générale made its appearance. […] Two of his 
contributions require special mention here: he drew a sharp distinction between the diachronic 
and the synchronic study of language, and he underlined the difference between langue and 
parole.” 
11 Augustine, De dialectica, ed. Jan Pinborg, translation with introduction and notes by B. Darrel 
Jackson, Dordrecht: Reidel. Quoted in Meier-Oeser 2011.  
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The question on whether this “other” is an idea or an object has been a matter of 
discussion for centuries in different disciplines12 and the terminology varies considerably 
from one theory to another. Moreover, the relationship between the sign and this “other” 
has been approached from different perspectives with diverse consequences in terms of 
epistemology and ontology. In what follows I will focus on two models which are mainly 
concerned with the linguistic sign as such: the bipartite one by Ferdinand de Saussure and 
the so called triangle of signification by Ogden and Richards. 
In his Course of general linguistics, Ferdinand de Saussure rejects the idea that a sign 
links a word with an object. Instead, he argues that the linguistic sign 
[…] is based on an association made by the mind between two very different things, but 
which are both mental and in the subject: an acoustic image is associated with a concept.13 
In Saussurean terminology the acoustic image is called “signifier” (signifiant) and the 
concept, “signified” (signifié). Other authors also speak of form and content or form and 
meaning. 
 
Fig. 1: Linguistic sign according to Saussure. 
Some years later, the Saussurean model was modified by Ogden and Richards, who 
extended the twofold model into a triangle, incorporating the referent. 
                                                          
12 For an overview, see Busse 2009: 24f. 
13 Saussure 1993: 74a (my emphasis). In the original French version: “le signe linguistique 
repose sur une association faite par l’esprit entre deux choses très différentes, mais qui sont 
toutes deux psychiques et dans le sujet: une image acoustique est associée à un concept” 
(Saussure 1993: 74). 
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Fig. 2: Triangle of signification. Cf. Ogden and Richards [1923] 1972: 11. 
Ogden and Richards’ concern was to clarify that the relation between the symbol (or 
sign) and the referent is not real but merely imputed: 
[…] in the normal situation we have to recognize that our triangle is without its base, that 
between Symbol and Referent no direct relation holds; and, further, that it is through this 
lack that most of the problems of language arise (Ogden and Richards [1923] 1972: 12, 
n. 1). 
We can combine these two models and thus arrive at the following basic schema: 
 
Fig. 3: Basic model of the linguistic sign. 
I would like to stress that these models are not concerned with the “outside world,” but 
with the process of signification that makes communication possible. In this manner they 
turn away from the object and, so to speak, situate the sign in the subject. Furthermore, 
they postulate that the link between signs and their referents is an arbitrary one, 
established by social convention. 
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2. Some interpretations of the “pre-Buddhist” nāmarūpa 
The idea of a possible correlation between nāmarūpa and Saussure’s linguistic sign was 
suggested by the linguist Edward S. Small in an article published in 1987. There Small 
associates nāma- with the signifier and -rūpa with the signified (Small 1987: 455). I find 
his suggestion worth considering because it differs from the other explanations I have 
encountered so far. For, in general, it is nāma- and not -rūpa which is associated with a 
concept or signified. Thus Reat interprets nāman as “conceptualisation” and rūpa as 
“appearance.”14 More ambiguous is Hamilton’s rendering “name and named,” which she 
further explains as “concept and conceived” (Hamilton 1996: 127). Bronkhorst for his 
part understands rūpa as the referent when he rephrases nāmarūpa as “words and the 
things denoted by them.”15 If we compare these interpretations on the basis of the model 
of the linguistic sign presented before, we can appreciate the discrepancies.  
 
   
   
 
Fig. 4: Interpretations nāmarūpa and the basic model of the linguistic sign. 
                                                          
14 See above, n. 8. 
15 Bronkhorst 2011: 3f. In the original French version: “les mots et les choses dénotées” 
(Bronkhorst 1999: 9). 
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3. nāman and rūpa in the Vedic texts 
3.1. nāman: Is a name always a “sign”? 
As early as the Ṛgveda, nāman comes up as “designation,” for instance in ṚV 7.103.6,16 
where it is said that the frogs (maṇḍūka) bear one common name although they look 
different and make different sounds. In this case I would not object that maṇḍūka (frog),17 
can be considered a sign and that it has a classificatory function. But nāman also comes 
up as a characteristic feature of an individual. For instance, in ṚV 10.169.2, where it is 
said that the cows look different (virūpāḥ) and—unlike the frogs—also bear personal 
names. And these names seem to be somehow different from our current understanding 
of personal names, for Agni is the only one who knows them and he gets access to that 
knowledge through the sacrifice.18 The same applies to the names of gods. In the Ṛgveda 
the different forms or manifestations of the gods are often called nāman19 and gods are 
said to have a secret name: guhyaṃ nāma.20 This secret name is identified21 with the 
                                                          
16 ṚV 7.103.6a–c gomāyur eko ajamāyur ekaḥ pṛśnir eko harita eka eṣām / samānaṃ nāma 
bibhrato virūpāḥ “One is Cow-bellow and Goat-bleat the other, one Frog is Green and one of 
them is Spotty. They bear one common name, and yet they vary” (trans. Griffith). “Der eine 
blökt wie eine Kuh, der andere meckert wie ein Bock. Der eine unter ihnen ist gefleckt, der 
andere grün. Sie führen den gleichen Namen und sind doch verschiedenfarbig” (trans. 
Geldner).  
17 Mentioned two verses before in ṚV 7.103.4c. 
18 ṚV 10.169.2ab yāḥ sarūpā virūpā ekarūpā yāsām agnir iṣṭyā nāmāni veda “Like-coloured, 
various-hued, or single-coloured [cows, LO], whose names through sacrifice are known to 
Agni” (trans. Griffith). “Die gleichfarbigen, verschiedenfarbigen, einfarbigen [Kühe, LO], 
deren Namen Agni durch das Opfer kennt” (trans. Geldner).  
19 For instance: ṚV 10.63.2ab viśvā hi vo namasyāni vandyā nāmāni devā uta yajñiyāni vaḥ “For 
worthy of obeisance, Gods, are all your names, worthy of adoration and of sacrifice” (trans. 
Griffith). “Denn alle eure Namen sind ehrwürdig, lobwürdig, ihr Götter, und anbetungswert” 
(trans. Geldner). Renou, for his part, takes viśvā nāmāni as substitute of viśve devās and 
explains: “le ‘nom’ étant du reste la personnalité même” (Renou 1958: 116). ṚV 
10.54.4a–d catvāri te asuryāṇi nāmādābhyāni mahiṣasya santi / tvam aṅga tāni viśvāni vitse 
yebhiḥ karmāṇi maghavañ cakartha “Thou [sc. Indra, LO], Mighty Steer, hast four supremest 
natures [nāma, LO], Asura natures that may ne’er be injured. All these, O Maghavan, thou 
surely knowest, wherewith thou hast performed thy great achievements” (trans. Griffith). 
“Vier sind deine [sc. Indra, LO], des Büffels, Herren-Namen, die untrüglichen. Du weißt alle 
diese, mit denen du, Gabenreicher, deine Taten vollbracht hast” (trans. Lüders 1959: 526).  
 ṚV 8.11.5a–c martā amartyasya te bhūri nāma manāmahe / viprāso jātavedasaḥ “We sages, 
mortals as we are, adore the mighty name of thee [sc. Agni, LO], Immortal Jātavedas’ name” 
(trans. Griffith). “Wir Sterblichen gedenken deiner [sc. Agnis, LO] vielen Namen, des 
Unsterblichen, des Jātavedas, wir Redekundigen” (trans. Geldner). 
20 ṚV 5.5.10a–c yatra vettha vanaspate devānāṃ guhyā nāmāni / tatra havyāni gāmaya 
“Vanaspati, wherever thou knowest the Gods’ mysterious names, Send our oblations 
thitherward” (trans. Griffith). “(Da), wo du, Baum [Herr des Holzes], weißt, daß die geheimen 
Namen der Götter (verborgen sind), dahin mach die Opferspeisen gehen!” (trans. Scarlata). 
ṚV 9.95.2cd devo devānaṃ guhyāni nāmāviṣkṛnoti “As God, the secret names of Gods he [sc. 
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nature or essence of the name bearer and has to be concealed in order to protect the gods 
from the effect or influence that someone uttering these names would have on them. As 
for the efficacy of names, ŚB 6.1.3.9 goes even further. After narrating how Agni asks 
Prajāpati to give him a name to guard him against evil, it is said that one should therefore 
give a new-born child many names.22 This passage reveals that the efficacy of names is 
not restricted to the names of gods. 
To my view the relation between personal names and the name bearer expressed in these 
texts is not that between a sign and its referent, for nāman, as a personal name, is not 
different from the name bearer, on the contrary it is an essential part of it. 
3.2. rūpa: The object of seeing 
In general, rūpa comes up as the object of seeing.23 This is why it is often rendered as 
“colour,” “appearance” and “form.”24 On the other hand, rūpa may also be a particular 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Soma, LO] utters” (trans. Griffith). “Der Gott [Soma, LO] offenbart der Götter geheime 
Namen” (trans. Geldner). 
 ṚV 10.45.2cd vidmā te nāma paramaṃ guhā yad vidmā tam utsaṃ yata ājagantha “We know 
what name supreme thou [sc. Agni, LO] hast in secret: we know the source from which thou 
hast proceeded” (trans. Griffith). “Wir kennen deinen [sc. Agnis, LO] höchsten Namen, der 
geheim ist; wir kennen den Quell, von wannen du gekommen bist” (trans. Geldner). 
 ṚV 10.55.2ab mahat tan nāma guhyam puruspṛg yena bhūtaṃ janayo yena bhavyam “That is 
the great much desired (or desired by many: pruspṛh) secret name, with which thou [sc. Indra, 
LO] createdst what had come into existence and what was to exist” (trans. Gonda 1970: 85). 
“Das ist der große geheime vielbegehrte Name, mit dem du [sc. Indra, LO] alles Gewordene 
und Werdende erzeugt hast” (trans. Geldner). 
21 See Grassmann [1872] 1964: 724 s.v. nāman; Böhtlingk/Roth 1855–1875: IV 113 s.v. nāman; 
Oldenberg 1919: 103; Lüders 1959: 526; and Mayrhofer 1992–2001: II 35. 
22 ŚB 6.1.3.9. tam prajāpatir abravīt / kumāra kiṃ rodiṣi yac chramāt tapaso ’dhi jāto ’sīti 
so ’bravīd anapahatapāpmā vā asmy ahitanāma nāma ma dhehīti tasmāt putrasya jātasya 
nāma kuryāt pāpmānam evāsya tad apahanty api dvitīyam api tṛtīyam abhipūrvam evāsya tat 
pāpmānam apahanti “Prajāpati said to him [sc. to Agni, LO], ‘My boy, why criest thou, when 
thou art born out of labour and trouble?’ He said, ‘Nay, but I am not freed from (guarded 
against) evil; I have no name given me: give me a name!’ Hence one should give a name to the 
boy that is born, for thereby one frees him from evil;—even a second, even a third (name), for 
thereby one frees him from evil time after time” (trans. Eggeling). 
23 Thus in ṚV 1.164.44d it is said and we can only see the gliding of Vāyu, the wind, but not his 
rūpa: dhrājir ekasya dadṛśe na rūpam “of one the sweep is seen, but not his figure” (trans. 
Griffith); “das Dahingleiten des einen ist sichtbar, nicht die Gestalt” (trans. Witzel/Gotō). And 
in ŚB 11.8.3.8 Vāyu is said to be invisible because he has been deprived of his rūpa: rūpam 
eva vāyor ādatta tasmād etasya lelayata ivaivopaśṛṇvanti na tv enam paśyanty āttaṃ hy asya 
rūpam ā ha vai dviṣato bhrātṛvyasya rūpaṃ datte ya evaṃ veda “He [sc. Āditya, the Sun, LO] 
took to himself Vāyu’s form; whence people hear it (the wind), as it were, shaking, but do not 
see it, for its form has been taken from it; and, verily, he who knows this takes away the form 
of his spiteful enemy” (trans. Eggeling). 
24 For instance: ṚV 7.97.6d rūpam aruṣam “rötliche Farbe” (trans. Geldner), “red colour” (trans. 
Griffith); ṚV 10.96.3d rūpā haritā “die goldgelben Farben” (trans. Geldner), Griffith and 
Nāmarūpa; a Linguistic Perspective  Liudmila Olalde 
9 
instance, form or manifestation of something or someone,25 for example in rituals.26 In 
this respect nāman and rūpa actually overlap and nothing indicates that they are 
somehow dependent on each other. Moreover, in ŚB 11.2.3 rūpa is said to be greater 
(jyāyas) than nāman, for all that has a name has a rūpa27 but not all that has a rūpa has a 
name. 
3.3. Nāman and rūpa as constituents of an individual 
In later texts (AV, AVPar, TB, JU and CU) nāman and rūpa are found next to each other 
in lists of different length.28 These enumerations allow for different interpretations of 
nāman and rūpa which cannot be discussed here.29 Suffice to say that they appear among 
other constituents of a living being, such as prāṇa (breath), āyus (life-time), and manas 
(mind), which indicates that nāman and rūpa were also considered to fall into this 
category. An understanding of nāman and rūpa as constituents is also supported by the 
passages that state that the loss of nāman and rūpa is not only possible but even 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Wilson, on the contrary, translate “forms of golden hue” (trans. Griffith), “golden-tinted 
forms” (trans. Wilson); ṚV 10.21.3c kṛṣṇā rūpāṇy arjunā “schwarze und weiße Farben” 
(trans. Geldner), “Black and white-gleaming colours” (trans. Griffith), “black forms and 
white” (trans. Wilson); ṚV 1.71.10c nabho na rūpaṃ jarimā mināti “Das Alter schädigt die 
Gestalt [rūpa, LO] wie die Wolke” (trans. Witzel/Gotō); “Das Alter verändert das Aussehen 
[rūpa, LO] wie die Wolke (ihr Aussehen ändert)” (trans. Geldner). Interestingly, Griffith 
translates here rūpa as “body:” “Old age, like gathering cloud, impairs the body [rūpa, LO].” 
25 For instance: ṚV 6.47.18a rūpaṃ rūpaṃ pratirūpo babhūva “In every figure [rūpa, LO] he 
hath been the model [pratirūpo, LO]” (trans. Griffith). “Jeglicher Gestalt hat er sich angepaßt” 
(trans. Geldner). ṚV 3.53.8ab rūpaṃ rūpaṃ maghavā bobhavīti māyāḥ kṛṇvānas tanvam 
pari svām “Maghavan weareth every shape at pleasure, effecting magic changes in his body” 
(trans. Griffith). “In eine Gestalt nach der anderen verwandelt sich der Vermögende, am 
eigenen Körper [tanū, LO] (seine erstaunlichen) Fähigkeiten anwendend [māyāḥ kṛṇvānaḥ, 
LO]” (trans. Witzel). 
26 Such as ŚB 10.4.3.21: tān nu sarvān ekam ivaivācakṣate ’gnir ity etasya hy evaitāni sarvāṇi 
rūpāṇi yathā saṃvatsarasyāhorātrāṇy ardhamāsā māsā ṛtava evam asyaitāni sarvāṇi rūpāṇi 
“all these (altars and hearths) are looked upon as only one, as Agni; for it is merely forms 
[rūpāni, LO] of him that they all are,—even as the days and nights, the half-moons, the 
months, and the seasons (are forms) of the year, so are they all forms of him (Agni)” (trans. 
Eggeling). “[D]iese alle [sc. Feueraltare, LO] benennt man wie einen: Agni, denn dessen rūpa 
sind sie alle. Wie (rūpa) des Jahres die Tage und Nächte, die Halbmonate, Monate, 
Jahreszeiten, so sind sie alle dessen rūpa” (Oldenberg 1919: 107). 
27 ŚB 11.2.3.5. tayor anyataraj jyāyo rūpam eva yad dhy api nāma rūpam eva tat “One of these 
two is the greater, namely Form; for whatever is Name, is indeed Form” (trans. Eggeling). 
28 For instance: AVPar 1.16.1. prāṇo’pāno vyānaḥ samāna udānaś cakṣuḥ śrotraṃ vāṅ manas 
tan navamaṃ … daśamaṃ nāmarūpe ekādaśadvādaśe “Life-breath, in-breath, inter-breath, 
link-breath, up-breath, sight, hearing, speech, mind is the ninth, … is the tenth, name and form 
are the eleventh and twelfth” (trans. LO; I follow Olivelle 1998 in the translation of the 
prāṇas). TB 3.10.5. satyaṃ tapo nāma rūpam, amṛtam, cakṣuḥ, śrotram, mana āyuḥ “truth, 
asceticism; name, form; immortality; sight, hearing; mind, vital power” (trans. Dumont). 
29 These passages are discussed in detail in Olalde 2014: chapter 1.3. 
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detrimental for the individual. Thus, in AV 12.5.9 it is said that a Kṣatriya who steals the 
cow of a Brahmin30 will lose several things, among them rūpa and nāman.31 An 
interesting parallel is found in JU 3.20.5 and 3.20.8, where the patron of the sacrifice 
(yajamāna) asks the earth (pṛthivī) to give him back his name (nāman) and his body 
(śarīra).32 The special status of nāman among the other constituents is moreover 
emphasized in BĀU 3.2.12 when Yājñavalkya explains to Ārtabhāga that when a man 
dies the only thing that does not leave him is his name.33 
In view of the passages discussed so far, I would agree with Gonda when he concludes 
that:  
[…] nāman- was regarded in many ancient milieus, as a […] potency, a ‘power-
substance’ which empirically, or within some form of experience is supposed to be 
present in persons, things and phenomena […] names are as essential a part of man’s 
personality as his physical strength, his organs, his life-breath, ritual power etc. (Gonda 
1970: 44). 
Gonda does not distinguish between nāman as a personal name and nāman as a 
designation, a distinction that I am drawing here in order to highlight that an 
understanding of names as signs might be satisfactory when dealing with designations of 
objects, but it definitely becomes problematic when we try to account for the relation 
between living beings (or gods) and their personal names. Another argument against the 
assumption that nāman is necessarily a sign encompassing a series of cognitive processes 
                                                          
30 AV 12.5.5. tām ādadānasya brahmagavīṃ jinato brāhmaṇaṃ kṣatriyasya “Of the Kshatriya 
who takes to himself that Brahman-cow, who scathes the Brahman” (trans. Whitney) 
31 AV 12.5.6. apa krāmati sūnṛtā vīryaṃ puṇyā lakṣmīḥ // 7. ojaś ca tejaś ca sahaś ca balaṃ ca 
vāk cendriyaṃ ca śrīś ca dharmaś ca // 8. brahma ca kṣatraṃ ca rāṣṭraṃ ca viśaś ca tviṣiś ca 
yaśaś ca varcaś ca draviṇaṃ ca // 9. āyuś ca rūpaṃ ca nāma ca kīrtiś ca prāṇaś cāpānaś ca 
cakṣuś ca śrotraṃ ca // 10. payaś ca rasaś cānnaṃ cānnādyaṃ cartaṃ ca satyaṃ ceṣṭaṃ ca 
pūrtaṃ ca prajā ca paśvaś ca // 11. tāni sarvāṇy apa krāmanti brahmagavīm ādadānasya 
jinato brāhmaṇaṃ kṣatriyasya // “6. There departs the happiness, the heroism, the good luck. 
7. Both force, and brilliancy, and power, and strength, and speech, and sense, and fortune, and 
virtue,— 8. and holiness, and dominion, and kingdom, and subjects, and brightness, and glory, 
and honor, and property,— 9. and life-time, and form, and name, and fame, and breath, and 
expiration, and sight, and hearing,— 10. and milk, and sap, and food, and food-eating, and 
righteousness, and truth, and sacrifice, and bestowal, and progeny, and cattle:— 11. All these 
depart from the Kshatriya who takes to himself the Brahman-cow, who scathes the Brahman” 
(trans. Whitney). 
32 JU 3.20.8. nāma me śarīram me pratiṣṭhā me / tan me tvayi tan me punar dehī’ti “My name, 
my body, my foundation. That of me is in thee; give that back to me” (trans. Oertel). 
33 BĀU 3.2.12. Yājñavalkyeti hovāca / yatrāyaṃ puruṣo mriyate kim enaṃ na jahātīti / nāmeti / 
anantaṃ vai nāmānantā viśve devāḥ / anantam eva sa tena lokaṃ jayati // “‘Yājñavalkya,’ 
Ārtabhāga said again, ‘tell me—when a man dies, what is it that does not leave him?’ ‘His 
name,’ replied Yājñavalkya. ‘A name is without limit, and the All-gods are without limit. 
Limitless also is the world he wins by it’” (trans. Olivelle). 
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is that, to the best of my knowledge, in the early Upaniṣads nāman is nowhere described 
as the object of manas.34 Instead it is repeatedly associated with vāc (speech), whereas 
rūpa is linked to cakṣus, for instance by Yājñavalkya in his enumeration of the eight 
sense organs or apprehenders (graha) and their corresponding objects (atigrāha)35 in 
BĀU 3.2: 
 
BĀU graha atigrāha 
3.2.2 prāṇa apāna 
3.2.3 vāc nāman 
3.2.4 jihvā rasa 
3.2.5 cakṣus rūpa 
3.2.6 śrotra śabda 
3.2.7 manas kāma 
3.2.8 hasta karman 
3.2.9 tvac sparśa 
Fig. 5: The eight apprehenders (graha) and their objects (atigrāha) according to BĀU 3.2.  
A similar scheme is found in KauṣU 3.2 and 3.3,36 where once more nāman is associated 
to vāc and rūpa to cakṣus (see fig. 6). In both cases, we do find manas, but it is associated 
with kāma (desire) and dhyāna (thought). Finally, I would like to highlight that in ŚB 
                                                          
34 Although in KauṣU 1.7 Brahman’s neuter names are correlated to manas, nāman here is not to 
be interpreted as the object of manas because this association is restricted to the 
correspondence in gender (cf. Olivelle 1998: 586). Brahman’s feminine and masculine names 
are respectively associated with prāṇa and vāc: KauṣU 1.7. tam āha kena me pau snāni 
nāmāny āpnoṣīti / prāṇeneti brūyāt / kena napu sakānīti / manaseti / kena strīnāmānīti / vāceti 
/ kena gandhān iti / ghrāṇeneti “Brahman then asks him: ‘By what means do you grasp my 
masculine names?’ He should reply: ‘With my breath.’ ‘And my neuter names?’ ‘With my 
mind.’ ‘And my feminine names?’ ‘With my speech.’ ‘And my odors?’ ‘With my sense of 
smell’” (trans. Olivelle). 
35 “Within the ritual, graha refers to a cup used to draw out Soma and atigraha refers to the 
offering of extra cupfuls of Soma. In the context of the body, graha is a sense organ and 
atigraha is the sense object grasped by it” (Olivelle 1998: 506). 
36 KauṣU 3.2. […] na hi kaścana śaknuyāt sakṛd vācā nāma prajñāpayituṃ cakṣuṣā rūpa  
śrotreṇa śabdaṃ manasā dhyānam “For, no one is able to bring himself to perceive separately 
a name with his speech, a visible appearance with his sight, a sound with his hearing, or a 
thought with his mind” (trans. Olivelle). KauṣU 3.3. […] tad enaṃ vāk sarvair nāmabhiḥ 
sahāpyeti / cakṣuḥ sarvai rūpaiḥ sahāpyeti / śrotra  sarvaiḥ śabdaiḥ sahāpyeti / manaḥ 
sarvair dhyānaiḥ sahāpyeti / sa yadāsmāc charīrād utkrāmati sahaivaitaiḥ sarvair utkrāmati // 
“[…] his speech merges into it [sc. breath, prāṇa, LO] together with all the names; his sight 
merges into it together with all the visible appearances; his hearing merges into it together 
with all the sounds; and his mind merges into it together with all the thoughts. And when the 
breath finally departs from this body, it is together with all these that it departs” (trans. 
Olivelle). 
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11.2.3.637 it is explicitly said that rūpa is mind (mano vai rūpam), and nāman is speech 
(vāg vai nāma), which suggests that, if at all, it is rūpa and not nāman, which gets closer 
to a “mental image.” 
 
 BĀU 3.2.3–7 KauṣU 3.2–3 ŚB 11.2.3.6 
vāc nāman nāman nāman 
cakṣus rūpa rūpa — 
manas kāma dhyāna rūpa 
Fig. 6: Associations of nāman and rūpa with speech, the eye and the mind. 
4. Nāmarūpa and the linguistic sign 
The fact that nāmarūpa appears several times in cosmogonic narratives has led some 
authors to conclude that, according to the Upaniṣads, creation consisted of naming, that 
is, of differentiation and conceptualization by means of nāmarūpa.38 Yet, what I observe 
in the cosmogonic narratives in the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads where nāmarūpa appears 
is something different: 
                                                          
37 See Appendix. 
38 For instance, Reat (1987: 18), who on the basis of BĀU 1.4.7, ChU 6.3.2–3 and 8.14.1 argues: 
“When it is said in the Upaniṣads that creation consisted of the differentiation of the universe 
by means of nāma-rūpa, what is implied is that the myriad discrete entities thus produced were 
and still are related in an orderly fashion by virtue of the fact that they bear names, which 
makes possible the conceptual ordering of manyness. Language was thought of as a discovery 
of the inherent conceptual relationships among things, so that from a very early period in 
Indian thought conceptualization was thought of as primarily a verbal phenomenon.” Another 
example is Hamilton (1996: 121f.): “In the earliest reference in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 
[11.2.3, LO] we read that when the universe consisted just of undifferentiated Brahman 
(neuter), it differentiated itself by means of nāmarūpa […] Similarly, we read in the 
Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad [1.4.7, LO] […] that the unmanifest or undifferentiated (avyākṛta) 
world became differentiated (vyākṛta) by means of nāma and rūpa […].” 
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ChU 6.2–3 ŚB 11.2.3.1–6 JU 4.22.1–8 TB 2.2.7 BĀU 1.4 
the existent 
(sat) 
brahman 
space 
(āśā) 
prajāpati 
ātman 
puruṣa 
heat 
(tejas) 
gods (deva) 
deities (devatā) 
worlds (loka) 
water 
(ap) 
creatures 
(prajā) 
husband and wife 
(pati and patnī) 
water 
(ap) 
nāman and rūpa 
heat 
(tapas) 
nāmarūpa 
human beings 
(manuṣya) 
food 
(anna) 
 prāṇa  animals 
nāmarūpa  apāna  agni 
  vyāna  soma 
  samāna  nāmarūpa 
  udāna   
  nāmarūpa   
Fig. 7: nāmarūpa in cosmogonic passages. 
As fig. 7 shows,39 according to these descriptions nāmarūpa is neither “responsible” for 
the creation of the universe nor for all differences in it. Actually, nāmarūpa steps in at the 
end of a more or less complex process of diversification.40 That this differentiation is not 
merely conceptual is moreover stated in ChU 6, where heat (tejas), water (ap) and food 
(anna)—the “three rūpās” (trīṇi rūpāṇi)—are said to be the real (satyam). 
ChU 6.4.1. yad agne rohitam̐ rūpaṃ tejasas tad rūpam / yac chuklaṃ tad apām / yat 
kṛṣṇaṃ tad annasya / apāgād agner agnitvam / vācārambhaṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyaṃ trīṇi 
rūpāṇīty eva satyam //  
The red appearance of a fire is, in fact, the appearance of heat, the white, that of water, 
and the black, that of food. So vanishes from the fire the character of fire—the 
transformation is a verbal handle, a name—while the reality is just, “It’s the three 
appearances” (trans. Olivelle) 
                                                          
39 These passages are quoted in the Appendix. For a detailed discussion, see Olalde 2014: 
chapters 1.4 and 1.5. 
40 Although in ChU 8.14.1 it is said that space “brings forth” (nirvahitṛ) name and form (āśo vai 
nāma nāmarūpayor nirvahitā), I think that this passage does not give enough elements to 
interpret it in cosmogonic terms. The meaning of nirvahitṛ is moreover unclear, as the 
following translations show: “Verily, what is called space is the accomplisher of name and 
form” (trans. Hume, my emphasis). “Der Äther (Raum, ākāśa) ist es, welcher die Namen und 
Gestalten auseinanderdehnt” (trans. Deussen, my emphasis). “En vérité, c’est l’ākāśa qui rend 
sensibles le nom et la forme” (trans. Silburn 1955: 111, my emphasis). “He who is called ether 
(l’ākāśa) is the revealer of all forms and names” (trans. Board of Oriental Scholars 2006: 250, 
my emphasis). “What is called space is that which brings forth name and visible appearance” 
(trans. Olivelle, my emphasis). 
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In these cosmogonic narratives nāman is most likely to be taken as a designation and 
rūpa as the form or appearance of things and living beings. And I think that this 
interpretation can indeed harmonize with the model of the linguistic sign presented at the 
beginning of this article (see fig. 3), yet in that case I would suggest, with Small, to 
regard nāman as a signifier (or acoustic image) and rūpa as the signified, leaving aside 
any tacit assumptions about the relation between language and the extra-linguistic reality. 
For, to my view, the ontological and epistemological status of nāmarūpa has to be 
examined in each particular case. Moreover, focussing on the acoustic nature of nāman 
can be the first step towards a better understanding of its relation to vāc. 
Now, what about the passages that depict the liberation of a person? In MuU 3.2.8, for 
instance, an individual that has attained liberation is said to merge into puruṣa like a river 
merges into the ocean, losing thus his name and visible appearance:  
MuU 3.2.8. yathā nadyaḥ syandamānāḥ samudre astaṃ gacchanti nāmarūpe vihāya / 
tathā vidvān nāmarūpād vimuktaḥ parāt paraṃ puruṣam upaiti divyam  
As the rivers flow on and enter into the ocean giving up their names and appearances; So 
the knower, freed from name and appearance, reaches the heavenly Person, beyond the 
very highest (trans. Olivelle).41 
Although one could take nāmarūpa as a set of cognitive processes that come to an end 
with liberation, we can also interpret nāman and rūpa as essential constituents of a living 
being, that is, nāman as a personal name and rūpa as shape or perhaps even body. This 
interpretation may be supported by ChU 6.10.1, where we find the simile of the rivers 
and the ocean but this time without nāmarūpa: 
ChU 6.10.1. imāḥ somya nadyaḥ purastāt prācyaḥ syandante paścāt pratīcyaḥ / tāḥ 
samudrāt samudram evāpiyanti / sa samudra eva bhavati / tā yathā tatra na vidur iyam 
aham asmīyam aham asmīti // 2. evam eva khalu somyemāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ sata āgamya na 
viduḥ sata āgacchāmaha iti / ta iha vyāghro vā si ho vā vṛko vā varāho vā kīṭo vā 
pataṅgo vā da śo vā maśako vā yad yad bhavanti tad ābhavanti // 
                                                          
41 In PrU 6.5 the description is more complex: Puruṣa is said to be within the body (śarīra) and 
to consist of sixteen parts (kalā) which merge into Puruṣa at death. This process is compared 
to the rivers losing their names and visible appearances when merging into the ocean: sa 
yathemā nadyaḥ syandamānāḥ samudrāyaṇāḥ samudraṃ prāpyāstaṃ gacchanti / bhidyete 
tāsāṃ nāmarūpe / samudra ity evaṃ procyate / evam evāsya paridraṣṭur imāḥ ṣoḍaśa kalāḥ 
puruṣāyaṇāḥ puruṣaṃ prāpyāstaṃ gacchanti / bhidyete cāsāṃ nāmarūpe / puruṣa ity evaṃ 
procyate / sa eṣo ’kalo ’mṛto bhavati “Now, take these rivers. They flow toward the ocean and, 
upon reaching it, merge into the ocean and lose their name and visible appearance; one simply 
calls it the ocean. In just the same way, these sixteen parts of the person who is the perceiver 
proceed toward the person and, upon reaching him, merge into that person, losing their names 
and visible appearances; one simply calls it the person. He then becomes partless and 
immortal” (trans. Olivelle). 
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1. Now, take these rivers, son. The easterly ones flow toward the east, and the westerly 
ones flow toward the west. From the ocean, they merge into the very ocean; they become 
just the ocean. In that state they are not aware that: ‘I am that river,’ and ‘I am this river.’ 
2. In exactly the same way, son, when all these creatures reach the existent, they are not 
aware that: ‘We are reaching the existent.’ No matter what they are in this world—
whether it is a tiger, a lion, a wolf, a boar, a worm, a moth, a gnat, or a mosquito—they 
all merge into that (trans. Olivelle). 
Finally, I conclude that we can make sense of the term nāmarūpa by understanding that it 
can be considered from two different perspectives. If we are interested on the processes 
of conceptualisation that take place in the subject, nāmarūpa can be compatible with the 
linguistic sign. But if we focus on the object, nāmarūpa cannot be understood as a sign, 
because nāman and rūpa are actually part of the object. Thus, if we look at nāmarūpa 
from the latter perspective and interpret it as a shape or body that has a personal name, 
we could also explain the passages in the Pāli Canon where nāmarūpa is said to coagulate 
(samucchissatha)42 or to descend (avakkanti)43 into the womb. 
 
 subject object 
nāman designation personal name 
rūpa appearance matter, body 
tejas, ap, anna (ChU 6.2–3) 
śarīra (JU 3.20.5 and 3.20.8) 
 linguistic sign no linguistic sign 
Fig. 8: Two perspectives on nāmarūpa. 
Furthermore, taking into account that personal names were considered an essential part 
of an individual that according to some texts44 may persist after death one may speculate 
that this could go someway to explaining why nāmarūpa became a technical term in 
Buddhism and nāman was decomposed into the four non-material skandhas. 
                                                          
42 Mahānidānasutta, DN II 62–63. 
43 SN II 66/12.39 and SN II 101/12.64. 
44 Such as BĀU 3.2.12 (see above, n. 33) and ṚV 5.57.5cd: sujātāso januṣā rukmavakṣaso divo 
arkā amṛtaṃ nāma bhejire “Edel von Geburt, Goldschmuck an der Brust, die Sänger des 
Himmels, wurden sie unsterblichen Wesens [amṛtaṃ nāma, LO] teilhalft” (trans. Lüders 1959: 
527); “wohlgeboren durch ihren Ursprung, mit goldenen Brustplatten geschmückt, haben sie 
als ‘Strahlen des Himmels’ sich einen unsterblichen Namen zugelegt” (trans. Scarlata). 
Griffith, on the contrary, read nāman as a metaphor: “Noble by birth, adorned with gold upon 
their breasts, the Singers of the sky have won immortal fame [amṛtaṃ nāma, LO]” (trans. 
Griffith). 
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Appendix: Nāmarūpa in cosmogonic passages 
ChU 6.2.2–6.3.4 
6.2.2. […] sat tv eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam // 3. tad aikṣata bahu syāṃ 
prajāyeyeti / tat tejo ’sṛjata / tat teja aikṣata / bahu syāṃ prajāyeyeti / tad apo ’sṛjata […] 
// 4 tā āpa aikṣanta bahvyaḥ syāma prajāyema hīti / tā annam asṛjanta […] //  
6.3.1. teṣāṃ khalv eṣāṃ bhūtānāṃ trīṇy eva bījāni bhavanty āṇḍajaṃ jīvajam udbhijjam iti 
// 2. seyaṃ devataikṣata hantāham imās tisro devatā anena jīvenātmanānupraviśya 
nāmarūpe vyākaravāṇīti // 3. tāsāṃ trivṛtaṃ trivṛtam ekaikāṃ karavāṇīti / seyaṃ 
devatemās tisro devatā anenaiva jīvenātmanānupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākarot // 4. tāsāṃ 
trivṛtaṃ trivṛtam ekaikām akarot / yathā tu khalu somyemās tisro devatās trivṛt trivṛd 
ekaikā bhavati tan me vijānīhīti //  
6.2.2. […] On the contrary, son, in the beginning this world was simply what is existent—
one only, without a second. 3. And it thought to itself: ‘Let me become many. Let me 
propagate myself.’ It emitted heat. The heat thought to itself: ‘Let me become many. Let 
me propagate myself.’ It emitted water. […] 4. The water thought to itself: ‘Let me 
become many. Let me propagate myself.’ It emitted food. […]  
6.3.1. There are, as you can see, only three sources from which these creatures here 
originate: they are born from eggs, from living individuals, or from sprouts. 2. Then that 
same deity thought to itself: ‘Come now, why don’t I establish the distinctions of name 
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and appearance by entering these three deities here with this living self (ātman), 3. and 
make each of them threefold.’ So, that deity established the distinctions of name and 
appearance by entering these three deities here with this living self (ātman), 4. and made 
each of them threefold. 
Learn from me, my son, how each of these deities becomes threefold. (trans. Olivelle) 
ŚB 11.2.3.1–6 
11.2.3.1. brahma vā idam agra āsīt tad devān asṛjata tad devān sṛṣṭvaiṣu lokeṣu 
vyārohayad asminn eva loke ’gniṃ vāyum antarikṣe divy eva sūryam 2. atha ye ’tha 
ūrdhvā lokāḥ tad yā ata ūrdhvā devatās teṣu tā devatā vyārohayat sa yathā haivema 
āvirlokā imāś ca devatā evam u haiva ta āvirlokās tāś ca devatā yeṣu tā devatā vyārohayat 
3. atha brahmaiva parārdham agacchat tat parārdhaṃ gatvaikṣata kathaṃ nv imāṃ lokān 
pratyaveyām iti taddvābhyām eva pratyavaid rūpeṇa caiva nāmnā ca sa yasya kasya ca 
nāmāsti tan nāma yasyo api nāma nāsti yad veda rūpeṇedaṃ rūpam iti tad rūpam etāvad 
vā idaṃ yāvad rūpaṃ caiva nāma ca 4. te haite brahmaṇo mahatī abhve sa yo haite 
brahmaṇo mahatī abhve veda mahad dhaivābhvam bhavati 5. te haite brahmaṇo mahatī 
yakṣe sa yo haite brahmaṇo mahatī yakṣe veda mahad dhaiva yakṣam bhavati tayor 
anyataraj jyāyo rūpam eva yad dhy api nāma rūpam eva tat sa yo haitayor jyāyo veda 
jyāyān ha tasmād bhavati yasmāj jyāyān bubhūṣati 6. martyā ha vā agre devā āsuḥ sa 
yadaiva te brahmaṇāpurathāmṛtā āsuḥ sa yam manasa āghārayati mano vai rūpam 
manasā hi vededaṃ rūpam iti tena rūpam āpnoty atha yaṃ vāca āghārayati vāg vai nāma 
vācā hi nāma gṛhṇāti teno nāmāpnoty etāvad vā idaṃ sarvaṃ yāvad rūpaṃ caiva nāma ca 
tat sarvam āpnoti sarvaṃ vā akṣayyam eteno hāsyākṣayyaṃ sukṛtam bhavaty akṣayyo 
lokaḥ  
11.2.3.1. Verily, in the beginning, this (universe) was the Brahman (neut.). It created the 
gods; and, having created the gods, it made them ascend these worlds: Agni this 
(terrestrial) world, Vāyu the air, and Sūrya the sky. 2. And the deities who are above 
these he made ascend the worlds which are above these; and, indeed, just as these (three) 
worlds and these (three) deities are manifest, so are those (higher) worlds and those 
(higher) deities manifest—(the worlds) which he made those deities ascend. 3. Then the 
Brahman itself went up to the sphere beyond. Having gone up to the sphere beyond, it 
considered, “How can I descend again into these worlds?” It then descended again by 
means of these two—Form and Name. Whatever has a name, that is name; and that again 
which has no name, and which one knows by its form, “This is (of a certain) form,” that is 
form: as far as there are Form and Name so far, indeed, extends this (universe). 4. These, 
indeed, are the two great forces of the Brahman; and, verily, he who knows these two 
great forces of the Brahman becomes himself a great force. 5. These, indeed, are the two 
great manifestations of the Brahman; and, verily, he who knows these two great 
manifestations of the Brahman becomes himself a great manifestation. One of these two 
is the greater, namely Form; for whatever is Name, is indeed Form; and, verily, he who 
knows the greater of these two, becomes greater than he whom he wishes to surpass in 
greatness. 6. In the beginning, indeed, the gods were mortal, and only when they had 
become possessed of the Brahman they were immortal. Now, when he makes the libation 
to Mind—form being mind, inasmuch as it is by mind that one knows, “This is form”—he 
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thereby obtains Form; and when he makes the libation to Speech—name being speech, 
inasmuch as it is by speech that he seizes (mentions) the name—he thereby obtains 
Name;—as far as there are Form and Name, so far, indeed, extends this whole (universe): 
all this he obtains; and—the all being the imperishable—imperishable merit and the 
imperishable world thus accrue to him (trans. Eggeling). 
JU 4.22.1–8 
4.22.1. āśā vā idam agra āsīd bhaviṣyad eva / tad abhavat / tā āpo ’bhavan / 2. tās 
tapo ’tapyanta / tās tapas tepānā huss ity eva prācīḥ prāśvasan / sa vāva prāṇo ’bhavat / 
3. tāḥ prāṇyā ’pānan / sa vā apāno ’bhavat / 4. tā apānya vyānan / sa vāva vyāno ’bhavat / 
5. tā vyānya samānan / sa vāva samāno ’bhavat / 6. tās samānyo ’dānan / sa vā udāno 
’bhavat / 7. tad idam ekam eva sadhamādyam āsīd aviviktam / 8. sa nāmarūpam akuruta / 
tenāi ’nad vyavinak / vi ha pāpmano vicyate ya evaṃ veda /  
4.22.1. Verily this was in the beginning space, being about to become. It became. It 
became the waters. 2. They performed penance. Having performed penance [uttering] 
huss, they breathed forth forward. That became breath. 3. Having breathed forth, they 
breathed out. That became exhalation. 4. Having breathed out, they breathed asunder. 
That became the vyāna. 5. Having breathed asunder, they breathed together. That became 
the samāna. 6. Having breathed together, they breathed up. That became the udāna. 7. 
This [all] was one, associated, not distinguished. 8. He made name and form. Thereby he 
distinguished it. Distinguished from evil is he who knows thus (trans. Oertel). 
TB 2.2.7 
prajāpatiḥ prajā asṛjata / tās sṛṣṭās samaśliṣyan / tā rūpeṇānu prāviśat / tasmād āhuḥ / 
rūpaṃ vai prajāpatir iti / tā nāmnānu prāviśat / tasmād āhuḥ / nāma vai prajāpatir iti 
Prajāpati created the creatures. When these were created, they were still adhering or 
sticking to one another [samaśliṣyan, LO]. Then he entered them with the form. That is 
why it is said: “Prajāpati is the form.” He entered them with the name. That is why it is 
said: “Prajāpati is the name” (trans. Frauwallner/Bedekar, Frauwallner [1973] 1984: 163). 
Prajāpati schuf die Geschöpfe. Als diese geschaffen waren, klebten sie noch aneinander 
[samaśliṣyan, LO]. Da ging er in sie ein mit der Form. Darum sagt man: Prajāpati ist die 
Form. Da ging er in sie ein mit dem Namen. Darum sagt man: Prajāpati ist der Name 
(trans. Frauwallner 1953: 206). 
BĀU 1.4.1–7 
This passage narrates that at the beginning (agre) the world was just ātman, shaped like a 
man (puruṣa). Finding no pleasure alone he split into husband (pati) and wife (patnī). 
They copulated and the human beings were born (1.4.3). Then the wife became a cow, 
the husband a bull; they copulated and cattle were born. They subsequently transformed 
into horses, donkeys, etc., and copulated, thus giving rise to all existing animals (1.4.4). 
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Afterwards ātman created the fire (agni), Soma and all gods. (1.4.6). Then we find the 
following description: 
BĀU 1.4.7 tad dhedaṃ tarhy avyākṛtam āsīt / tan nāmarūpābhyām eva vyākriyatāsau 
nāmāyam idam̐ rūpa iti / tad idam apy etarhi nāmarūpābhyām eva vyākriyate ’sau 
nāmāyam idam̐ rūpa iti  
At that time this world was without real distinctions; it was distinguished simply in terms 
of name and visible appearance—“He is so and so by name and has this sort of an 
appearance.” So even today this world is distinguished simply in terms of name and 
visible appearance, as when we say, “He is so and so by name and has this sort of an 
appearance” (trans. Olivelle).  
